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Abstract
In a claims problem an estate has to be divided among several claimants
whose total claim exceeds the size of the estate. This paper extends the
noncooperative approach, initiated by O’Neill (1982), by allowing players
to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering
the case where individual claims may exceed the estate. A full characte-
rization of the set of Nash equilibria is obtained both for restricted claims
problems, where individual claims do not exceed the estate, and for the
general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result
in proportional division in equilibrium.
1 Introduction
In a claims problem – also called bankruptcy problem – players have claims
on an estate, and the sum of these claims exceeds the size of the estate. The
question is how to distribute the estate among the players, based on their claims.
There is a substantial literature on this problem, starting with O’Neill (1982)
and Aumann and Maschler (1985). Most of this literature considers claims
problems from a cooperative, axiomatic point of view. See Thomson (2003) for
a relatively recent overview.
In the present paper we take a non-cooperative approach to the claims pro-
blem. This is not entirely new: in fact, our model extends a non-cooperative
game already proposed by O’Neill (1982). In our basic model, we think of the
estate E as represented by the interval [0, E], on which players can put claims.
Each player can partition the interval [0, E] into finitely many subintervals and
on each of those subintervals put an integer (0, 1, 2, . . .) number of claims. Each
∗This paper combines independent work of the first author (Atlamaz, 2004) and the last
three authors (Berden et al. 2008; also reported in Berden, 2008).
†Bates White LLC, 1300 Eye Street NW, Suite: 600, Washington, DC 22030, USA. E-mail
address: : murat.atlamaz@bateswhite.com.
‡Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616,
6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 43 3883835. Email-addresses:
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claim has ‘height’ 1, and the total area occupied by player i’s claims should be
equal to ci, where ci is player i’s total claim as given by the claims problem. The
difference with the model proposed by O’Neill (1982) is that we allow players to
put more than one claim on one and the same subinterval of E. We will actual-
ly see that this admits Nash equilibria in the claim game that are excluded by
O’Neill’s game. Moreover, if a player’s total claim ci exceeds the estate, then
we cannot but allow for multiple claims.
Another interpretation of our claim game is to think of the interval [0, E]
as a continuum of uniformly distributed consumers (cf. Hotelling, 1929), and
of the claimants as firms who provide services to these consumers, with firm i
providing total service ci. In this case, each part of the consumer continuum is
distributed proportionally with respect to the claims – now called investments
– of the firms. Note that this interpretation naturally allows for competitive
investments by different firms in one and the same consumer segment, thus, for
multiple claims in the bankruptcy terminology.
In still other settings the proportions induced by the claims of the players
may be interpreted as probabilities of winning in, for instance, political elections
(cf. Merolla, Munger, and Tofias, 2003) or auctions (cf. Cramton, Gibbons,
and Klemperer, 1987). There is also a connection with the classical Colonel
Blotto game (Borel, 1921). In the present paper, however, we will stick to the
bankruptcy problem interpretation.
We first treat restricted claims problems, in which claims do not exceed the
estate (ci ≤ E for each i). We characterize all Nash equilibria of our game, and
the associated payoff distributions. This case was also studied by O’Neill (1982).
As already mentioned, the possibility of multiple claims of a player on one and
the same part of the estate allows for additional Nash equilibria. Roughly, these
equilibria are advantageous for larger claimants (see Example 4.8).
Restricted claims problems are, of course, a special case of general (unre-
stricted) problems. Nevertheless, we study the general case after the restricted
case since, for the latter, a more explicit description of Nash equilibria is feasi-
ble. We also present a complete characterization for the general (unrestricted)
case. In that case, however, Nash equilibria may fail to exist. Further, we show
that Nash equilibrium payoffs converge to proportional distribution of the estate
with respect to the claims as these claims become large.
In our basic model we assume that a player can claim some interval a non-
negative integer number of times. In the paper we also investigate what happens
if we allow smaller claim heights (e.g., 12 ,
1
3 , . . .) and thus ‘finer’ claims. Not
surprisingly, Nash equilibrium distributions converge again to the proportional
distribution as the claim height becomes smaller. We may also drop the assump-
tion that players split their claims into finitely many parts: as an extreme case,
we assume that a strategy of a player is a (continuous) nonnegative function on
the estate interval [0, E] with total integral equal to ci. Intuitively this should
again lead to proportional distribution, and we will show that this is indeed the
case, even under more restrictive strategies.
Besides O’Neill (1982) there are other articles which deal with strategic mo-
dels imposed on claims problems. Chun (1989) defines a game where players pro-
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pose division rules. The non-cooperative solution of this game of rules converges
to the outcome associated with the constrained equal awards rule. Dagan et al.
(1997) construct a consistency based noncooperative model that supports mo-
notonic consistent cooperative solution concepts. Corchón and Herrero (2004)
define a game where players propose awards vectors bounded by claims. Garćıa-
Jurado et al. (2006) define an elementary game which has a unique payoff vector
in Nash equilibrium associated with any acceptable bankruptcy rule. Our paper
is based on the work of the last three authors (Berden et al. 2008, also reported
in Berden, 2008), and the independent work of Atlamaz (2004).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the basic
model. Section 3 derives general necessary conditions for Nash equilibria. In
Section 4 we consider restricted claims problems and in Section 5 general pro-
blems. Variations on our basic model are discussed in Section 6, and Section 7
concludes.
2 The model
The set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2. A claims problem is a pair
(E, c), where E ∈ R with E > 0 is the estate and c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ RN with
ci > 0 for each i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E is the vector of claims.
A payoff vector for (E, c) is a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN with
∑
i∈N xi ≤
E. In this paper we assume that payoff vectors are reached as equilibrium
outcomes of a non-cooperative game in strategic form. Specifically, for the
larger part of the paper, we assume that a strategy of player i consists of a
finite partition of the interval [0, E] into subintervals and on each subinterval a
nonnegative integer number of (sub-)claims, such that the total amount claimed
is equal to ci. It is without loss of generality to assume that the strategies of
all players have the same partition in common, since otherwise we can always
consider the common refinement of the player partitions instead. Thus, we
obtain the following definition.
Definition 2.1 A claims profile for the claims problem (E, c) is a triple (y, β, m),
where
(i) m ∈ N, m ≥ 1.
(ii) y = (y0, . . . , ym) ∈ Rm+1 with 0 = y0 < y1 < . . . < ym−1 < ym = E.
(iii) β = (β1, . . . , βn), with βi : {1, . . . , m} → {0} ∪ N such that
m∑
t=1
βi(t) (yt − yt−1) = ci
for all i ∈ N .
We assume that for a claims profile (y, β,m), each interval (yt−1, yt) is dis-
tributed among the players proportionally with respect to their claims. More
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precisely, let M = {1, . . . , m} and for each t ∈ M let βN (t) =
∑
i∈N βi(t). For
each i ∈ N and t ∈ M let
β̂i(t) =
{
βi(t)
βN (t)
if βi(t) > 0
0 if βi(t) = 0.
Then player i receives payoff1
xi =
m∑
t=1
β̂i(t) [yt − yt−1] . (1)
A claims profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can increase his payoff by
reshuffling his claims. Intuitively, this means that the marginal utilities on the
intervals in the claims profile should be ‘more or less’ equal: complete equality
is generally not possible since the claims are integers. For simplicity, we will just
define Nash equilibrium claims profiles in terms of marginal utilities or, more
specifically, marginal gains and losses.2
Definition 2.2 A claims profile (y, β, m) for claims problem (E, c) is a Nash
equilibrium profile (NEP) if βN (t) ≥ 1 for all t ∈ M and if, moreover, the
following condition is satisfied: for all t, t′ ∈ M , t 6= t′, and all i ∈ N , if
βi(t) ≥ 1, and βN (t) ≥ 2, then
βi(t)
βN (t)
− βi(t)− 1
βN (t)− 1 ≥
βi(t′) + 1
βN (t′) + 1
− βi(t
′)
βN (t′)
. (2)
Inequality (2) says that the loss incurred by taking away a claim (or part
of a claim) from some interval t should be at least as big as the gain obtained
by putting that claim on some other interval t′. A particular consequence of
this inequality is that, if βi(t) = βN (t) for some i ∈ N and t ∈ M , then
βi(t) = βN (t) = 1. This follows since there is always a t′ with βi(t′) < βN (t′).
Thus, if a player is the only one to claim a certain part of the estate, then he
claims this part only once.
A restricted claims problem is a claims problem (E, c) with ci ≤ E for
all i ∈ N . O’Neill (1982) considered restricted claims problems and a non-
cooperative claim game in which each part can be claimed at most once by the
same player. We will see that allowing players to claim more than once leads
to a larger set of NEP and NEP payoff vectors. For general claim problems, of
course, we cannot avoid allowing multiple claims anyway.
1Observe that, if each part of the estate is claimed at least once, then these payoffs sum to
E. We allow that some parts are not claimed, in which case the total payoff is smaller than
E. In a Nash equilibrium, however, this will not occur.
2The following definition can be derived as a result from a more basic definition of Nash
equilibrium. See Berden et al. (2008) or Berden (2008) for a detailed proof. The crucial
insight is that the marginal losses at the left hand side of (2) increase as we remove more
claims from t, while the marginal gains at the right hand side decrease as we add more claims
to t′. This indicates, indeed, that condition (2) is not only necessary but also sufficient for
Nash equilibrium.
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3 Some general results
Throughout this section (y, β, m) is a Nash equilibrium claims profile for the
claims problem (E, c). We derive three results, which will be used for later
analysis and also have independent interest.
The first lemma says that if some player claims some part t at least twice,
then he should put positive claims on each part t′ of the estate on which total
claims do not exceed total claims on t.
Lemma 3.1 Let i ∈ N , t, t′ ∈ M , βi(t) ≥ 2, and βN (t′) ≤ βN (t). Then
βi(t′) ≥ 1.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to what we wish to prove, that βi(t′) = 0. Then
βi(t
′)+1
βN (t′)+1
− βi(t′)βN (t′) = 1βN (t′)+1 ≥ 1βN (t)+1
> 2βN (t) − 1βN (t)−1 =
βN (t)−2
βN (t)(βN (t)−1)
≥ βN (t)−βi(t)βN (t)(βN (t)−1) =
βi(t)
βN (t)
− βi(t)−1βN (t)−1 ,
where the strict inequality follows from straightforward calculation3. This con-
tradicts (2) and concludes the proof. ¤
The next lemma shows that that the difference between the numbers of
claims on each part of the estate can be at most 2.
Lemma 3.2 For all t, t′ ∈ M , |βN (t)− βN (t′)| ≤ 2.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to what we wish to prove, that there are t, t′ ∈ M
with βN (t) ≥ βN (t′) + 3.
(i) First, suppose that βi(t) ≥ βi(t′) + 1 for some i ∈ N . From (2) we easily
derive
βi(t′) ≥ βN (t′)− (βN (t)− βi(t)) βN (t
′)(βN (t′) + 1)
βN (t)(βN (t)− 1) , (∗)
hence
βi(t′) ≥ βN (t′)− (βN (t)− βi(t′)− 1) βN (t
′)(βN (t′) + 1)
βN (t)(βN (t)− 1) .
In turn, this implies
βi(t′) ≥ `k(k − 1)− `(` + 1)(k − 1)
k(k − 1)− `(` + 1) , (∗∗)
where k = βN (t) and ` = βN (t′). Now
RHS(∗∗) > `
2
⇔ (k − `)(k − `− 3) + 2 > 0
3Or from strict convexity of the function x → 1/x.
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and the RHS of this equivalence is clearly true by our assumptions. Hence,
βi(t′) > `/2 = βN (t′)/2. But this means that there can be at most one player i
for which βi(t) ≥ βi(t′) + 1. Thus, all players except possibly one player claim
in t at most what they claim in t′.
(ii) From part (i) it follows that there is a player i ∈ N with βi(t)− βi(t′) ≥
βN (t)− βN (t′). From (∗) we now have
βi(t′) ≥ `− (k − (βi(t′) + k − `)) `(` + 1)
k(k − 1) ,
which after rearranging terms implies βi(t′) ≥ ` = βN (t′), hence βi(t′) = βN (t′),
and thus βi(t) = βN (t) ≥ 3. This is a contradiction since (y, β, m) is an NEP. ¤
We will see later (Section 5) that an NEP with the maximal difference of 2 as
in Lemma 3.2 can occur. For restricted claims problems, however, this cannot
happen, as we will see in the next section.
The final lemma in this section says that, if a player has a claim on an
interval t, then he should also have a claim on any interval t′ on which the total
number of claims is at least two less than on t.
Lemma 3.3 Let t, t′ ∈ M , i ∈ N , βi(t) ≥ 1, and βN (t′) ≤ βN (t) − 2. Then
βi(t′) ≥ 1.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to what we wish to prove, that βi(t′) = 0. Then
βi(t
′)+1
βN (t′)+1
− βi(t′)βN (t′) = 1βN (t′)+1 >
βN (t)−βi(t)
βN (t)(βN (t′)+1)
> βN (t)−βi(t)βN (t)(βN (t)+1) =
βi(t)
βN (t)
− βi(t)−1βN (t)−1 ,
contradicting (2). ¤
4 Restricted claims problems
We first derive some additional results for an NEP in restricted claims problems,
and next use these to characterize all NEP in such problems.
In Lemmas 4.1–4.4, claims profile (y, β, m) is an NEP for the restricted claims
problem (E, c). We denote βmax = maxt∈M βN (t) and βmin = mint∈M βN (t).
The first lemma says that each player has at most one claim in the maximally
claimed intervals.
Lemma 4.1 βi(t) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and t ∈ M with βN (t) = βmax.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to what we wish to prove, that βi(t) ≥ 2 for some
i ∈ N and t ∈ M with βN (t) = βmax. Since ci ≤ E, there must be a t′ ∈ M
with βi(t′) = 0, but this contradicts Lemma 3.1. ¤
The next lemma says that the differences in total numbers of claims between
intervals can be at most 1.
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Lemma 4.2 βmax − βmin ≤ 1.
Proof. If this were not true then, by Lemma 3.2, there would be t, t′ ∈ M
with βN (t)− βN (t′) = 2, βN (t) = βmax, βN (t′) = βmin. By Lemma 4.1 there are
exactly βN (t) different players with a claim (namely, of 1) on t. By Lemma 3.3
all these players have at least one claim on t′, but this is clearly impossible. ¤
The next lemma implies that each player has at most two claims on each
interval.
Lemma 4.3 βi(t) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N and t ∈ M .
Proof. Let i ∈ N . In view of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 it is sufficient to prove
βi(t) ≤ 2 for t ∈ M with βN (t) = βmax − 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that
βi(t) ≥ 3 for such a t. Since ci ≤ E and by Lemma 3.1, there is t′ ∈ M with
βi(t′) = 0 and βN (t′) = βmax. By using (2) we obtain
(βmax − 1)− βi(t)
(βmax − 1)(βmax − 2) ≥
1
βmax + 1
hence
βmax − 4
(βmax − 1)(βmax − 2) ≥
1
βmax + 1
.
It is easy to check that the latter inequality cannot hold. ¤
In the final lemma we observe that if the bound of 2 in the preceding lem-
ma is reached, then there must be an interval with at least five claims on it.
Consequently, by Lemma 4.1, the number of players is at least five as well.
Lemma 4.4 Let i ∈ N and βi(t) = 2 for some t ∈ M with βN (t) = βmax − 1.
Then βmax ≥ 5.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4.3, there is a t′ ∈ M with βi(t′) = 0 and
βN (t′) = βmax. By (2),
2
βmax − 1 −
1
βmax − 2 ≥
1
βmax + 1
which implies βmax ≥ 5. ¤
Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1–4.4 provide a number of necessary conditions for a
claims profile (y, β,m) to be an NEP. By Lemma 4.2 in particular it follows
that there is a K ∈ N such that on each interval there are K or K + 1 claims.
Let R ∈ R be the total part of E that is claimed K + 1 times. Then 0 ≤ R < E
and we must have
∑
i∈N
ci = K(E −R) + (K + 1)R = KE + R
so K and R are uniquely determined by E and
∑
i∈N ci. The main result of
this section is the following theorem, which says that the necessary conditions
provided by the mentioned lemmas are also sufficient.
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Theorem 4.5 Let (E, c) be a restricted claims problem, and let K ∈ N and
R ∈ R with 0 ≤ R < E be the unique numbers satisfying ∑i∈N ci = KE + R.
Then a claims profile (y, β, m) for (E, c) is an NEP if and only if the following
four conditions are satisfied:
(A1) For all t ∈ M , βN (t) ∈ {K, K + 1} .
(A2) For all t ∈ M and i ∈ N , if βN (t) = K + 1 then βi(t) ≤ 1.
(A3) For all t ∈ M and i ∈ N , if βN (t) = K then βi(t) ≤ 2.
(A4) For all t ∈ M and i ∈ N , if βi(t) = 2 then βi(t′) ≥ 1 for all t′ with
βN (t′) = K, and K ≥ 4.
Observe that, if R = 0, then (A4) in fact implies βi(t) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and
t ∈ M , since ci ≤ E for all i.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Necessity follows from Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1–4.4. For
sufficiency, it is convenient to consider the following tables associated with a
claims profile satisfying (A1)–(A4).
Case βN (t) βi(t) marginal loss
(i) K + 1 1 1K+1
(ii) K 1 1K
(iii) K 2 2K − 1K−1
and
Case βN (t′) βi(t′) marginal gain
(a) K 0 1K+1
(b) K 1 2K+1 − 1K
(c) K 2 3K+1 − 2K
(d) K + 1 0 1K+2
(e) K + 1 1 2K+2 − 1K+1
The upper table gives the marginal losses incurred by removing a claim in
any of the three possible cases (i)–(iii). The lower table gives the marginal gains
by adding a claim in each of the five possible cases (a)–(e). It is straightforward
to check that condition (2) is satisfied for each shift of a claim from one of the
cases (i)–(iii) to one of the cases (a)–(e). ¤
Theorem 4.5 gives a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium claims
profiles for restricted claims problems. A description of the associated payoff
vectors is as follows. Let ri denote the part of player i’s total claim ci invested
in intervals with number of claims K + 1. Obviously, ri ≤ ci and by (A2) in
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Theorem 4.5, ri ≤ R. Hence, ri ≤ min{ci, R}. On the other hand, by (A3),
we have ci − ri ≤ 2(E − R): the part invested in intervals with number of
claims equal to K cannot exceed two times the remaining part E − R of the
estate. Hence, ri ≥ max{ci − 2(E − R), 0}. Additionally, the ri should sum
up to (K + 1)R. Summarizing, each NEP corresponds to a vector (r1, . . . , rn)
satisfying
∑
i∈N
ri = (K +1)R, and max{ci− 2(E−R), 0} ≤ ri ≤ min{ci, R} for all i ∈ N.
(3)
Conversely, each such vector gives rise to an NEP. Although there are many
NEP associated with the same (r1, . . . , rn) since there is quite some freedom in
choosing the intervals and distributing the claims, all these NEP have the same
payoffs, namely
xi =
ri
K + 1
+
ci − ri
K
. (4)
Equations (3) and (4) imply that the set of payoff vectors attainable by an NEP
is determined by linear inequalities and, in particular, is a polytope. These
equations are also convenient to check if a certain payoff, e.g. the payoff prescri-
bed by some well known rule, can be obtained in an equilibrium. The following
example shows this for the proportional rule: in particular, it implies that the
proportional rule does not have to result in an equilibrium payoff vector.
Example 4.6 Consider the restricted claims problem (E, c) with E = 6 and
c = (1, 2, 5). The so-called proportional rule distributes the estate proportional
to the claims and assigns the payoff vector x =
(
6
8 ,
12
8 ,
30
8
)
. For this problem,
K = 1 and R = 2. Hence, 0 ≤ r1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ r2 ≤ 2, and 0 ≤ r3 ≤ 2, while
r1 +r2 +r3 = 4. Hence, in an NEP player 1’s payoff is in [12 , 1], player 2’s payoff
is in [1, 32 ], and player 3’s payoff is in [4,
9
2 ]. Since
30
8 < 4, it follows that the
proportional payoff vector is not an equilibrium payoff vector.
Remark 4.7 If there are two players (n = 2) then it is easy to see by direct
inspection or by using the results above that the only choice for (r1, r2) is:
r1 = r2 = R. This results in the unique equilibrium payoffs xi = (E + ci− cj)/2
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. These payoffs coincide with the payoffs of the so-called
minimal overlap rule. See Alcalde et al. (2008) for a recent characterization of
this rule.
We conclude this section with an example which indicates that NEP in which
some players have double claims on part of the estate tend to favor ‘big’ players.
Example 4.8 Consider the claims problem (E, c) with E = 1, n = 17, c1 =
c2 = 0.9, and c3 = . . . = c17 = 0.2. Then K = 4 and R = 0.8. From the point
of view of players 1 and 2, the payoff-best NEP is one where both players put 2
claims on part E−R = 0.2 of the estate. Consider for instance the NEP (y, β, 7)
with y = (0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 1), β1 = β2 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2), β3 = . . . =
β5 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), β6 = . . . = β8 = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), β9 = . . . = β11 =
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(0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0), β12 = . . . = β14 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0), β15 = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0),
β16 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0), and β17 = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0). Then players 1 and 2 have
payoffs 0.2 each, and the other players receive 0.04 each. In an NEP where
players 1 and 2 do not have double claims, they receive at most 14 ·0.2+ 15 ·0.7 =
0.19; in such an equilibrium the other players receive at most 14 · 0.2 = 0.05.
5 General claims problems
For the general claims problem, where claims are not restricted (not all ci smaller
than or equal to E), a first observation to make is that NEP may fail to exist.
Example 5.1 Consider the two-player claims problem (E, c) with E = 1 and
c = (1.1, 12 ). Assume (w.l.o.g.) that player 2 puts claims on the interval [0, d]
with d ≤ 12 . Obviously, to obtain an NEP, player 1 should claim [d, 1] exactly
once. Suppose there were a part of [0, d] claimed more than once by player 2,
say (w.l.o.g.) [0, e] with e ≤ d. Player 2’s marginal loss on [0, e] is at most 16 ,
attained if player 1 has one claim on [0, e] and player 2 has two claims on [0, e]:
then 2’s marginal loss is 23 − 12 . His marginal gain by adding a claim on [d, 1]
would be 12 , hence this would not be part of an NEP. Therefore, we have d =
1
2 ,
and player 2 claims [0, 12 ] exactly once. Next, we may assume (w.l.o.g.) that
player 1 claims [0, 0.1] twice and [0.1, 1] once: this is, essentially, the unique
best reply. But then, player 2’s marginal loss by removing a claim from [0, 0.1]
would be 13 , while his marginal gain by adding a claim on [
1
2 , 1] would be
1
2 .
Hence, there is no NEP.
Recall from Lemma 3.2 that a claims profile (y, β, m) for a claims problem
(E, c) satisfies βmax − βmin ≤ 2, hence βmax − βmin ∈ {0, 1, 2}. These three cases
are considered in the following subsection.4
5.1 A complete characterization of NEP
5.1.1 The case βmax − βmin = 2
We present a characterization of all NEP satisfying βmax − βmin = 2.
Proposition 5.2 Let (y, β, m) be an NEP for the claims problem (E, c) such
that βmax − βmin = 2. Then there are players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, such that the
following three conditions hold.
(i) For each t ∈ M with βN (s) = βmax, βi(s) = βj(s) = βmax2 .
(ii) For each s ∈ M with βN (s) = βmin, βi(s) = βj(s) = βmin2 .
(iii) For each s ∈ M with βN (s) = βmin + 1,
βi(s), βj(s) ∈ {βmin2 ,
βmax
2
}.
4It can be shown that also in the general case the payoffs associated with NEP form a
(possible empty) polytope. See Atlamaz (2004).
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Note that this proposition implies that for every player k 6= i, j, βk(s) = 0
if βN (s) ∈ {βmin, βmax}, and βk(s) ∈ {0, 1} if βN (s) = βmin + 1 (= βmax − 1).
Hence, there are two ‘big players’ i and j, and all other players have at most
one claim per interval, and zero claims in all minimally or maximally claimed
intervals.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Let t, t′ ∈ M with βN (t) = βmax and βN (t′) = βmin.
(a) First note that there cannot be any player i ∈ N with βi(t)− βi(t′) ≥ 2:
this would lead to a contradiction in exactly the same way as in part (ii) of the
proof of Lemma 3.2.
(b) Hence, by Lemma 3.3, there must be i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, with βi(t) =
βi(t′) + 1 and βj(t) = βj(t′) + 1. By (∗∗) in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we have
βi(t′), βj(t′) ≥ βmin βmax(βmax − 1)− (βmin + 1)(βmax − 1)
βmax(βmax − 1)− βmin(βmin + 1) .
Since the right hand side of this inequality is equal to βmin2 , we must have
βi(t′) = βj(t′) = βmin2 , and thus βi(t) = βj(t) =
βmax
2 . For any other s ∈ M
with βN (s) = βmax it follows that βi(s) = βj(s) = βmax2 by applying (a) and
Lemma 3.3 to s and t′. Similarly, by the same arguments it follows that for any
other s ∈ M with βN (s) = βmin we have βi(s) = βj(s) = βmin2 . This proves (i)
and (ii).
(c) Let t′′ ∈ M with βN (t′′) = βmin + 1 (= βmax− 1). Suppose βi(t′′) < βmin2 .
Then βi(t′′) + 1 < βmax and thus
βmax
2 − (βi(t′′) + 1)
βmax
<
βmax
2 − (βi(t′′) + 1)
βmax − 1
which implies
βi(t)
βN (t)
− βi(t)− 1
βN (t)− 1 <
βi(t′′) + 1
βmin + 2
− βi(t
′′)
βmin + 1
,
violating (2). Similarly, if βi(t′′) > βmax2 then (2) is violated for t
′′ (in the
role of t in (2)) and t′. We conclude that βi(t′′) ∈ {βmin2 , βmax2 } and, similarly,
βj(t′′) ∈ {βmin2 , βmax2 }. ¤
It turns out that the three conditions in Proposition 5.2 are also sufficient
for an NEP.
Proposition 5.3 Let (y, β, m) be a claims profile for claims problem (E, c) and
assume that the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) βmax − βmin = 2.
(b) There are i, j ∈ N such that:
(i) For each s ∈ M with βN (s) = βmax, βi(s) = βj(s) = βmax2 .
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(ii) For each s ∈ M with βN (s) = βmin, βi(s) = βj(s) = βmin2 .
(iii) For each s ∈ M with βN (s) = βmin + 1,
βi(s), βj(s) ∈ {βmin2 ,
βmax
2
}.
Then (y, β, m) is an NEP.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that (2) holds in all possible cases. ¤
An NEP (y, β,m) looks (w.l.o.g.) as follows. Take m = 3 and 0 = y0 < y1 <
y2 < y3 = E; let L ∈ N, βN (1) = 2L + 2, βN (2) = 2L + 1, and βN (3) = 2L.
If i and j are the big players, then there must be 0 ≤ αh ≤ 1 for each h ∈ N
with
∑
h∈N αh = 1 such that ci = LE + y1 + αi(y2 − y1), cj = LE + y1 +
αj(y2 − y1), and ch = αh(y2 − y1) for all h 6= i, j. This implies that there are
0 < di, dj < E with ci = LE + di, cj = LE + dj , and
∑
h6=i,j ch +max{di, dj} <
E. Conversely, if all these conditions are satisfied, then we can construct an
NEP by taking y1 = min{di, dj} and y2 =
∑
h6=i,j ch + max{di, dj}. Hence, we
have the following corollary, which characterizes all claims problems that have
an NEP as in Proposition 5.3.
Corollary 5.4 Claims problem (E, c) has an NEP (y, β, m) with βmax−βmin = 2
if and only if there are i, j ∈ N , L ∈ N, and di, dj ∈ R with 0 < di, dj < E, such
that (i) ci = LE+di and cj = LE+dj, and (ii)
∑
h∈N\{i,j} ch+max{di, dj} < E.
5.1.2 The case βmax − βmin = 0
This is a very special case since all parts of the estate are claimed equally. Hence,
the total claim
∑
i∈N ci must be an integer multiple of E. We will present our
characterization without proof.5
Proposition 5.5 Let (y, β, m) be a claims profile for the claims problem (E, c)
such that βmax − βmin = 0. Then (y, β,m) is an NEP if and only if the following
two conditions are satisfied.
(i) βi(t)− βi(t′) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and all t, t′ ∈ M .
(ii) If βi(t)− βi(t′) = 1 for some i ∈ N and t, t′ ∈ M , then
βi(t) ≤ βmax + 12 .
5.1.3 The case βmax − βmin = 1
Also for this case we present the complete characterization without proof, see
footnote 5.
5 The proof follows familiar lines, always using (2), and is available upon request.
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Proposition 5.6 Let (y, β, m) be a claims profile for the claims problem (E, c)
such that βmax − βmin = 1. Then (y, β,m) is an NEP if and only if the following
seven conditions are satisfied.
(i) βi(t)− βi(t′) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N and all t, t′ ∈ M .
(ii) If i ∈ N and t, t′ ∈ M such that βi(t) = βi(t′) and βN (t) = βmin, βN (t′) =
βmax, then
βi(t) ≤ 3β
2
min + 3βmin
4βmin + 2
.
(iii) If i ∈ N and t, t′ ∈ M such that βi(t) = βi(t′) + 1 and βN (t) = βN (t′) =
βmax, then
βi(t) ≤ βmax + 12 .
(iv) If i ∈ N and t, t′ ∈ M such that βi(t) = βi(t′) + 1 and βN (t) = βmin,
βN (t′) = βmax, then
βi(t) ≤ β
2
max − 1
2βmax − 1 .
(v) If i ∈ N and t, t′ ∈ M such that βi(t) = βi(t′) + 1 and βN (t) = βN (t′) =
βmin, then
βi(t) ≤ βmax2 .
(vi) If i ∈ N and t, t′ ∈ M such that βi(t) = βi(t′) + 2, then βN (t) = βmin,
βN (t′) = βmax, and
βi(t) ≤ β
2
max + 3βmax − 4
4βmax − 2 .
In the next subsection we consider a special class of claims problems where
it is easy to describe an explicit NEP.
5.2 Claims containing an equal multiple of the estate
Here we study a class of claims problems where existence of an NEP is guaran-
teed, and where an NEP can be easily described. These are the problems where
each player’s claim contains an equal multiple of the whole estate.
Proposition 5.7 Let L ∈ N and let (E, c) be a claims problem with ci = LE +
di, 0 < di ≤ E for each i ∈ N . Let (y, β′,m) be an NEP for the restricted
claims problem (E, d), and let (y, β, m) be the claims profile for (E, c) with
βi(t) = L + β′i(t) for each i ∈ N and t ∈ M . Then (y, β, m) is an NEP for
(E, c).
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Proof.6 Observe that Theorem 4.5 applies to the NEP (y, β′,m) for (E, d).
This gives rise to the following marginal loss and gain tables for the claims
profile (y, β, m), where – as in Theorem 4.5 – K is the total claim on minimally
claimed intervals in (y, β′,m) and K + 1 the total claim on maximally claimed
intervals. The table of marginal losses is as follows.
Case βN (t) βi(t) marginal loss
(i) nL + K + 1 L + 1 L+1nL+K+1 − LnL+K
(ii) nL + K L + 1 L+1nL+K − LnL+K−1
(iii) nL + K L + 2 L+2nL+K − L+1nL+K−1
(iv) nL + K L LnL+K − L−1nL+K−1
(v) nL + K + 1 L LnL+K+1 − L−1nL+K
The table shows all cases possible in view of the characterization in Theorem
4.5. Similarly, there are five cases to consider with respect to marginal gains:
Case βN (t′) βi(t′) marginal gain
(a) nL + K L L+1nL+K+1 − LnL+K
(b) nL + K L + 1 L+2nL+K+1 − L+1nL+K
(c) nL + K L + 2 L+3nL+K+1 − L+2nL+K
(d) nL + K + 1 L L+1nL+K+2 − LnL+K+1
(e) nL + K + 1 L + 1 L+2nL+K+2 − L+1nL+K+1
In order to check that for all shifts of a claim from one of the cases (i)–(v) to one
of the cases (a)–(e), note that shifts from (iii) to (a) and from (iv) to (c) do not
have to be considered since, by (A4) in Theorem 4.5, theses cases cannot occur
simultaneously. As can be verified, the marginal losses are ordered according to
(iii) < (i) < (ii) < (v) < (iv) and the marginal gains according to (a) > (d) >
(b) > (e) > (c). It is, thus, sufficient to check that, first, the marginal loss in
case (i) is at least as big as the marginal gain in case (a), and that, second, the
marginal loss in case (iii) is at least as big as the marginal gain in case (d). The
loss in (i) is actually equal to the gain in (a). By using the fact that K ≥ 4 and
n ≥ 5, as follows from (A4), it can be shown that the marginal loss in (iii) is at
least as big as the marginal gain in (d). ¤
In an NEP in Proposition 5.7, each player claims L times the whole estate.
The remainders of the claims are distributed over [0, E] such as to form an
equilibrium of the kind in Theorem 4.5.
6An alternative proof can be given by applying the results – especially Propositions 5.5
and 5.6 – of the preceding section.
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Observe that for n > 2 the classes of claims problems of Corollary 5.4 on
the one hand and Proposition 5.7 on the other hand, are clearly disjoint: in the
former there are exactly two ‘big’ players, whereas in the latter all players are
‘big’. For n = 2 there is overlap, resulting in different types of equilibria, as the
following example shows.
Example 5.8 Let n = 2, E = 1, c = (1.4, 1.8). An equilibrium (y, β, m) accor-
ding to Corollary 5.4 (or Proposition 5.2) is as follows: m = 3; y = (0, 0.4, 0.8, 1);
β1 = (2, 1, 1), β2 = (2, 2, 1). In this NEP, βmax = 4 and βmin = 2.
An equilibrium (y, β, m) according to Proposition 5.7 is as follows: m = 3;
y0 = (0, 0.2, 0.4, 1); β1 = (2, 2, 1), β2 = (2, 1, 2). In this NEP, βmax = 4 and
βmin = 3.
The next example shows that also if n > 2 there may be equilibria different
from the ones described in Proposition 5.7.
Example 5.9 Let n = 4, E = 4, c = (5.1, 5.1, 5.1, 5.8). An equilibrium of
the type of Proposition 5.7 is (y, β,m) with m = 4, y = (0, 1.1, 2.2, 3.3, 4),
β1 = (2, 1, 1, 1), β2 = (1, 2, 1, 1), β3 = (1, 1, 2, 1), and β4 = (2, 1, 1, 2).
Another equilibrium is (y, β, m) with m = 2, y = (0, 2.9, 4), β1 = β2 = β3 =
(1, 2), and β4 = (2, 0). In this NEP, player 4 puts no claims on the interval
[2.9, 4].
There are claims problems, other than those described in Proposition 5.7,
where NEP with βmax − βmin = 1 exist. An example is the following.
Example 5.10 Let n = 3, E = 1, c = (2.6, 3.7, 4.2). The total claim is 10.5.
Clearly, by Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 5.4, if there is an NEP (y, β, m), it must be
the case that βmax−βmin = 1. An example of such an NEP is as follows: m = 4,
y = (0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 1), β1 = (3, 3, 3, 2), β2 = (4, 3, 3, 4), and β3 = (4, 5, 4, 4).
This can be checked directly, or by applying Proposition 5.6.
5.3 An asymptotic result
We conclude this section by showing that – not unexpectedly – the distributions
resulting from NEPs converge to the proportional distribution if the claims tend
to infinity.
Theorem 5.11 Let (E, c), (E, c1), (E, c2), . . . be a sequence of claims problems
with limk→∞ cki = ∞ for all i ∈ N and limk→∞ ck/
∑
j∈N c
k
j = c. For each
k ∈ N let (yk, bk,mk) be an NEP for (E, ck) with payoff vector xk. Then
limk→∞ xk = Ec.
Proof. By Propositions 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6, for all t, t′ ∈ M and all i ∈ N , we have
|βki (t)− βki (t′)| ≤ 2 for all k. It follows, in particular, that xki → Eci/
∑
j∈N cj
for every i ∈ N as k →∞. ¤
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6 Some variations
In the model considered so far, in a claims problem (E, c) a player i can put
any nonnegative integer claim on some part of the estate, as long as total claims
do not exceed ci. We can express this by saying that the claim height is equal
to 1 and players put multiples of this claim height on parts of the estate. A
natural question to ask is what would happen if we change this claim height to
some number 0 < γ ≤ 1. We can go a step further and assume that players
can choose from a finite or infinite number of claim heights, or even vary claim
heights over each point of the interval [0, E] for an estate E. This section is
devoted to a discussion of these variations.
6.1 Fixed claim height smaller than 1
Suppose the claim height is γ with 0 < γ ≤ 1. For a claims problem (E, c)
and a claims profile (y, β,m), βi(t) ∈ {0} ∪N is now interpreted as the number
of claims of height γ put by player i ∈ N on interval t ∈ M . In order to
distinguish such a claim profile from a claim profile with claim height 1 we will
write (y, β,m; γ). The associated payoff distribution is still given by (1). The
feasibility constraint becomes ci =
∑m
t=1 βi(t)γ(yt − yt−1) for each player i.
The obvious condition7 for an NEP similar to (2) is
βi(t)γ
βN (t)γ
− βi(t)γ − γ
βN (t)γ − γ ≥
βi(t′)γ + γ
βN (t′)γ + γ
− βi(t
′)γ
βN (t′)γ
,
but this inequality is of course equivalent to (2). Together with the feasibili-
ty condition this implies that (y, β, m; γ) is an NEP for (E, c) if and only if
(y, β, m) = (y, β, m; 1) is an NEP for (E, c/γ). A consequence of these consi-
derations and Theorem 5.11 is that equilibrium distributions converge to the
proportional distribution as the claim height goes to zero. Formally, we have
the following result.
Corollary 6.1 Let 1 ≥ γ1 > γ2 > . . . with limk→∞ γk = 0 and let (yk, βk,mk;
γk) be an NEP for (E, c) for each k ∈ N, with payoff distribution xk. Then
limk→∞ xk = Ec/
∑
i∈N ci.
6.2 Arbitrary claim height
For a claims problem (E, c) and a claims profile (y, β, m), we now assume that
βi(t) ∈ R+ = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0} for all i ∈ N and t ∈ M . We denote such a claims
profile by (y, β,m;R+). The payoff distribution is given by (1). The feasibility
constraint is still ci =
∑m
t=1 βi(t)(yt − yt−1) for each player i. The condition8
similar to (2) for an NEP is now
βi(t)
βN (t)
− βi(t)− ε
βN (t)− ε ≥
βi(t′) + ε
βN (t′) + ε
− βi(t
′)
βN (t′)
7Cf. footnote 2.
8Cf. footnote 2.
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for each i ∈ N , t ∈ M with βi(t) > 0, t′ ∈ M , and 0 < ε < βi(t). This inequality
can be rewritten to
βN (t)− βi(t)
βN (t) (βN (t)− ε) ≥
βN (t′)− βi(t′)
βN (t′) (βN (t′) + ε)
and this is satisfied for each ε > 0 if and only if
∑
j∈N\{i} βj(t)
(βN (t))
2 ≥
∑
j∈N\{i} βj(t
′)
(βN (t′))
2 . (5)
Note that, if βi(t′) > 0 as well, then also the converse of this inequality has to
hold, hence we have equality.
Consider any claims profile (y, β,m;R+) and a player i ∈ N . Given the
claims profile restricted to N \ {i}, namely (y, (βj)j∈N\{i},m;R+), and assu-
ming9 that
∑
j∈N\{i} βj(t) > 0 for all t ∈ M , player i can guarantee a payoff of(
ci/
∑
j∈N cj
)
E by claiming according to β′i defined by
β′i(t) =

ci/
∑
j∈N\{i}
cj

 ∑
j∈N\{i}
βj(t)
for all t ∈ M . This way, player i obtains his proportional share of every interval,
and thus of the estate E. Since this is true for every player i, every NEP
(y, β, m;R+) for (E, c) must result in the proportional distribution. Moreover,
it follows easily from (5) that (y, β, 1;R+) – thus, each player i putting a claim of
height ci on the whole interval [0, E] – is an NEP. We call this profile the uniform
claims profile. In fact, the uniform claims profile is the unique10 NEP among
the claims profiles (y, β, m;R+). This can be seen as follows. Let (y, β, m;R+)
be an NEP different from the uniform claims profile. Clearly, we may assume
βN (t) > 0 for all t ∈ M . Now there must be an i ∈ N and t, t′ ∈ M such that∑
j∈N\{i} βj(t) >
∑
j∈N\{i} cj/E >
∑
j∈N\{i} βj(t
′). (This is so since against a
constant total claim of N \{i}, player i’s unique best reply is to claim uniformly
– this follows from (5).) By claiming proportionally according to β′i as above,
player i obtains his proportional payoff
(
ci/
∑
j∈N cj
)
E. In that case, we have
∑
j∈N\{i} βj(s)
(βN (s))
2 =
1
∑
j∈N\{i} βj(s)
(
1 + ci/
∑
j∈N cj
)2
for s = t, t′. Therefore, (5) is violated, implying that player i can improve his
payoff by transferring part of his claim from t to t′. This, in turn, implies that
his equilibrium payoff is higher than proportional, a contradiction.
Summarizing, we have the following result.
9If this assumption is not satisfied then player i can even do better by putting a claim of
very small height on the non-claimed part(s) of the interval [0, E].
10In the sense of numbers of claims on each part of the estate.
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Proposition 6.2 Among all claims profiles (y, β, m;R+) for claims problem
(E, c), the uniform claims profile, resulting in the proportional payoff distribu-
tion Ec/
∑
i∈N ci, is the unique NEP.
6.3 Arbitrary claim height point-wise
We now assume that a claims profile for (E, c) is any n-tuple of continuous
functions fi : [0, E] → R+ such that for each i ∈ N ,
∫ E
0
fi(t)dt = ci. Denote
fN (t) =
∑
i∈N fi(t) for each t ∈ [0, E] and, for each i ∈ N and t ∈ [0, E],
f̂i(t) =
{
fi(t)
fN (t)
if fi(t) > 0
0 if fi(t) = 0.
Then the payoff distribution associated with f = (f1, . . . , fn) is given by
xi =
∫ E
0
f̂i(t)dt for every i ∈ N .
Within this model the uniform claims profile is the profile u = (u1, . . . , un)
defined by ui(t) = ci/E for all i ∈ N and t ∈ [0, E]. In this case, by arguments
analogous to those in the preceding subsection we obtain the following result.
Proposition 6.3 Among all claims profiles f = (f1, . . . , fn) for claims pro-
blem (E, c), the uniform claims profile u, resulting in the proportional payoff
distribution Ec/
∑
i∈N ci, is the unique NEP.
Remark 6.4 A variation in-between claim height 1 and arbitrary claim height
is the following. For a claims problem (E, c), player i first divides the rectangle
with height 1 and width ci into smaller rectangles by choosing a finite number
of cuts on the horizontal interval [0, ci] and a finite number of cuts on the
vertical interval [0, 1]. Next, player 1 puts these rectangular claims on the estate
[0, E]. It can be shown that still any NEP must result in the proportional
distribution – the uniform claims profile may, however, not even be feasible.
Among the variations discussed above, this is the minimal (coursest) variation
that nevertheless results in proportional distribution in equilibrium. See Berden
(2008) for the details.
7 Concluding remarks
Extending an approach initiated by O’Neill (1982), the present paper offers
non-cooperative solutions to the claims (or bankruptcy) problem. An interes-
ting additional observation is that many well known bankruptcy rules do not
always pick equilibrium payoff distributions. Example 4.6 shows this for the
proportional rule, but examples can be constructed for many other rules as
well. See Proposition 7 in Atlamaz (2004), which shows this for the constrai-
ned equal losses rule and the truncated equal losses rule, the constrained equal
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awards rule and the truncated equal awards rule, and the Talmud rule, besi-
des the proportional rule.11 This observation raises the question if there is an
axiomatic, normative justification for the ‘rule’ found in this paper, namely the
correspondence that assigns the set (polytope) of NEP payoff distributions to
each claims problem.
In our approach the proportional division rule plays an important role, which
is not surprising since it is used to define payoffs in the basic strategic game.
This raises the issue of what happens if some other principle is used to define
the payoffs in this game.
A third interesting issue arises if the implicit assumption of a homogeneous
estate is dropped. In the present paper, players are indifferent as to the different
parts of the interval [0, E]. Dropping this assumption leads to a model closely
related to models of land division or, more generally, division of heterogeneous
goods, see among others Berliant (1985), Berliant and Ten Raa (1988), Berliant
et al. (1992), and Legut et al. (1994).
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